University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 1

Article 3

2017

Juror Assessment of Certainty About Firearms Identification
Evidence
Sarah L. Cooper
Paraic Scanlon

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Sarah L. Cooper and Paraic Scanlon, Juror Assessment of Certainty About Firearms Identification
Evidence, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 95 (2017).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss1/3

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

JUROR ASSESSMENT OF CERTAINTY ABOUT FIREARMS
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
Dr. Sarah L. Cooper* & Dr. Páraic Scanlon**
I. INTRODUCTION
Many firearms examiners believe they can reliably engage in individualization, i.e., conclude that a particular gun fired a particular bullet to the
“exclusion of all other[s] . . . .”1 Over the last century, to aid the determination of criminal liability, such conclusions have been routinely admitted into
American courtrooms as expert evidence.2
However, criticism about the ability of crime-solving forensic disciplines, including firearms/tool-mark identification, to engage in reliable individualization has grown throughout the 1990s and new millennium.3 This
is largely due to the increasing sophistication and ability of DNA technology
to identify both criminals and persons wrongly convicted.4 In particular, the
National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) in its landmark 2009 report –
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward
(“Strengthening”) - concluded that “no forensic method [including firearms
identification] has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between
evidence and a specific individual or source”5 except for DNA analysis.6
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1. Adina Schwartz, Challenging Firearms and Toolmark Identification—Part One, 32
CHAMPION 14, Oct. 2008.
2. Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & Joseph L. Peterson, Reference Guide
on Forensic Identification Expertise, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55, 91
(3rd ed. 2011). (“The technique subsequently [after the 1920’s] gained widespread judicial
acceptance and was not seriously challenged until recently.”).
3. Eadaoin O’Brien et al., Science in the Court: Pitfalls, Challenges and Solutions, 370
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 1674, 1 (2015).
4. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 8 (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING].
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id.
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Although challenged by some stakeholders,7 concerns raised in Strengthening have been respectively echoed and followed up by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology8 (“PCAST”) and the National
Commission on Forensic Science (“NCFS”).9
Some American courts have acknowledged the existence of scientific
uncertainty in the context of firearms individualization evidence since
2005.10 To address this uncertainty, these courts have restricted expert testimony; instructing experts to not testify in absolute terms, such as “there is
an exact match,” but rather in allegedly more diluted terms, such as a match
can be made “more likely than not” and “to a reasonable degree of certainty.”11 Jurors must determine the weight of such evidence in criminal trials.12
Research indicates various challenges can arise when jurors assess scientific
evidence, including that jurors often lack scientific expertise; find comfort in
alleged expert certainty; and can be confused by phrases such as “to a reasonable degree of certainty.”13
It is therefore important to further investigate the levels of certainty jurors attach to common expert phrases. To do this, the authors conducted a
study examining the effect of twelve expert statements of certainty on potential jurors.14 Results from a sample of 107 participants found a significant
main effect for certainty, suggesting that participant certainty was influenced by expert testimony.15 There was a general trend of significant findings, with increased expert certainty leading to increased participant certainty, with some notable exceptions.16

7. See infra Part I(B).
8. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS (2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
9. See generally National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs (last visited May 17, 2017). Note the NCFS’ charter expired on
April 23, 2017.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005); United
States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Monteiro, 407 F.
Supp. 2d. 351 (2006).
11. See infra Part I(C).
12. Sarah Lucy Cooper, Forensic Identification Evidence: Tensions Between Law and
Science, 16 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. 1, 21 (2016), http://jpsl.org/files/7814/6014/5245/ForensicScie
nceIdentification.pdf. (“Jurors play a pivotal role in assessing the reliability and weight of
scientific evidence.”).
13. Id. at 13–14. See also Bonnie Lanigan, Firearms Identification: The Need for a
Critical Approach to, and Possible Guidelines for, the Admissibility of “Ballistics” Evidence,
17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 54, 71 (2012).
14. See infra Appendix A for t-tests data.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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This article contextualizes and presents the method and findings of our
study in order to contribute to multi-disciplinary efforts nationwide to generate more knowledge about juror interpretation of expert forensic science
evidence. Part II provides an overview of the process of firearms identification; debates concerning its validity; and court approaches to addressing
scientific uncertainty in the discipline.17 Part III explores current literature
concerning juror interpretation of expert evidence.18 Part IV discusses the
methods and findings of the authors’ study; comments on how the study’s
findings might inform current judicial approaches; and outlines the authors’
recommendations for furthering this research topic.19
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE AUTHORS’ STUDY
This section sets out the process of firearms identification, recent debates about the validity of the discipline, and court approaches to legal challenges to the admissibility of firearms identification evidence.
A.

The Process of Firearms Identification

When the hard metal of an internal part of a firearm connects with the
softer metal of the ammunition, it makes a tool-mark on the ammunition.20
Two distinct types of tool-marks may be created: striations and impressions.21 Striations are similar to small scratches, and are most often produced
on the bullet as it passes through the gun barrel.22 Impressions usually resemble dimples or craters, and are typically produced on the cartridge as it
comes into contact with the various internal parts of the firing chamber (e.g.
the firing pin, breach face, extractor, and ejector).23 Tool-marks can be divided into class, subclass, and individual characteristics.24 Class characteristics result from design factors and are determined prior to manufacture,25
which means they are “distinctively designed features” and will be present
on every tool in that class.26 By contrast, individual characteristics are
unique to a particular tool and consist of purportedly random, microscopic
imperfections and irregularities present on the tool’s surface.27 Subclass
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 10, 12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
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characteristics straddle the line between class and individual characteristics.28 Subclass characteristics arise when manufacturing processes create
batches of tools that are similar to each other but distinct from other tools of
the same class.29
To evaluate whether a suspect firearm fired suspect ammunition, examiners visually compare tool-marks present on suspect ammunition to those
present on test ammunition fired by the suspect weapon.30 For more than
eighty years, examiners have primarily used the comparison microscope to
undertake this evaluation.31 Nowadays, their work can also be supported by
ballistics imaging technology and national databases, such as the National
Integrated Ballistic Information Network (“NIBIN”).32
Through applying these methods many examiners believe they can
make reliable conclusions about identification, including individualization.
In 1998, the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners (“AFTE”),
the leading professional organization in this field, developed a protocol
(“AFTE Protocol”) detailing when an examiner may reach a certain conclusion.33 Under the AFTE Protocol, an examiner may make one of four conclusions: (1) identification; (2) inconclusive; (3) elimination; or (4) unsuitable for comparison.34
To make an “identification” (i.e., a “match”), there must be “sufficient
agreement” between the tool-marks subject to examination.35 Under AFTE’s
Theory of Identification, which was adopted in 1992, “sufficient agreement”
relates “to the significant duplication of random toolmarks”36 as evidenced
by “the correspondence of a pattern or combination of patterns of surface
contours.”37 An agreement is considered significant “when the agreement in
individual characteristics exceeds the best agreement demonstrated between
toolmarks known to have been produced by different tools and is consistent
28. See Id. (stating that subclass characteristics differ from individual characteristics
because they are shared by more than one tool, but they cannot fall under class characteristics
because every tool in that class does not share them).
29. Id.
30. STRENGTHENING, supra note 4, at 152–53.
31. ROBERT M. THOMPSON, FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION IN THE FORENSIC SCIENCE
LABORATORY 8 (2010), http://ndaa.org/pdf/Firearms_identity_NDAAsm.pdf.
32. Id. at 29–30 (summarizing NIBIN). See generally National Integrated Ballistic
Information Network (NIBIN), BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-integrated-ballistic-information-network-nibin
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2018).
33. Ass’n of Firearms & Tool Mark Exam’rs, Theory of Identification as It Relates to
Toolmarks, 30(1) ASS’N FIREARMS & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS J., 86 (1998).
34. Id. at 86–87.
35. AFTE Theory of Identification, ASS’N OF FIREARMS & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS,
https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification (last visited May 17, 2017).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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with agreement demonstrated by toolmarks known to have been produced
by the same tool.”38 A conclusion that there is “sufficient agreement” between two toolmarks “means that the agreement of individual characteristics
is of a quantity and quality that the likelihood another tool could have made
the mark is so remote as to be considered a practical impossibility.”39 The
theory states that the interpretation of identifications is subjective but
“founded on scientific principles and based on the examiner’s training and
experience.”40
B.

Current Debates About Validity

Over the last three decades in particular, forensic disciplines such as
firearms identification have been subject to growing criticism.41 Unreliable
forensic science evidence is now a proven cause of wrongful conviction,
with nearly half of the wrongful convictions associated with all 356 postconviction DNA exonerations being attributable, in some way, to such evidence.42 These cases have underscored criticism that “little systematic research has been conducted to validate the [forensic science] field’s basic
premises and techniques. . . .”43
Such criticism has underpinned national level concern about firearms
identification evidence. In 2008, the National Research Council of the National Academies published its Ballistic Imaging Report,44 and although the
report was not intended to be an overall assessment of the firearms identification discipline, the report found the validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related tool-marks had
not yet been fully demonstrated.45 The Committee took the view that a significant amount of research would be needed to scientifically determine the
degree to which firearms-related tool-marks are unique, or even to qualitatively characterize the probability of uniqueness.46
Strengthening, which examined past, current, and the future use of forensic science in the United States, further cemented these views in 2009.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., O’Brien et al., supra note 3.
42. See Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://
www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ (last visited May 04,
2018).
43. Paul C. Giannelli, Commentary, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 103, 112 (2001).
44. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 2008).
45. See United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175–1176 (D.N.M. 2009) (discussing the focus and scope of Ballistic Imaging).
46. Id.
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Strengthening concluded that class characteristics can be “helpful in narrowing the pool of tools that may have left a distinctive mark”47 and that individual characteristics “might, in some cases, be distinctive enough to suggest one particular source.”48 It also commented, however, that the AFTE
Protocol was not defined in a sufficiently precise way for examiners to follow, particularly in relation to when an examiner can conclude a “match.”49
The AFTE Protocol was limited because it “does not even consider, let
alone address, questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability, or
the number of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of confidence.”50 Overall, Strengthening concluded “the scientific knowledge base
for toolmark and firearms analysis is fairly limited,”51 and in order to make
the process of individualization more precise and repeatable “additional
studies should be performed.”52 Strengthening did not comment specifically
on the admissibility of such evidence.
In 2016, President Obama’s PCAST published a report, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of FeatureComparison Methods, in response to questions raised by President Obama
post-Strengthening. President Obama wanted to know if additional steps
remained to be taken to help “ensure the validity of forensic evidence used
in the Nation’s legal system.”53 PCAST concluded that two important gaps
remain, namely (1) a need for clarity about the scientific standards for the
validity and reliability of forensic methods and (2) a need to evaluate specific forensic methods (including firearms identification) to determine whether
their validity and reliability has been scientifically established.54 With regard
to firearms identification, PCAST stated its conclusions were “consistent”
with those in Strengthening,55 and that only one appropriate black box study
had been undertaken.56 On the question of admissibility, PCAST stated that
the decision “belongs to the courts,”57 but “[i]f firearms analysis is allowed
in court, the scientific criteria for validity as applied should be understood to
require clearly reporting the error rates seen in the one appropriately designed black-box study. Claims of higher accuracy are not scientifically

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

STRENGTHENING, supra note 4, at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 154.
PCAST REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. (showing estimated error-rates could be as high as 1 in 46).
Id at 12.
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justified at present.”58 PCAST made a number of recommendations to judges in this vein.59
Although stakeholders largely share the vision that there is a need to
continually enhance forensic science, they do not equally share concerns
about the validity of firearms identification evidence. For example, in 2009,
post-Strengthening, FBI employees specializing in firearms and tool-marks
published views that the discipline is both “highly valuable and highly reliable in its traditional methods.”60 Other groups have challenged the findings
in Strengthening, including AFTE.61 More recently, AFTE has responded
critically to the PCAST Report, expressing its “disappointment” that the
report ignored research indicating “firearm and toolmark identification is
scientifically valid,”62 and that if the AFTE Theory is applied properly, “examiners are able to conduct quality, accurate analysis.”63 Indeed, a number
of studies have highlighted reliability in the field.64 The FBI, Department of
Justice, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) have also expressed “disappointment” with the PCAST Report.65
They strongly disagree with the report’s recommendations “regarding the
admission of forensic evidence in criminal trials, particularly with respect to
firmly established firearm and tool mark forensic evidence.”66 ATF summarized,
58. Id.
59. PCAST REPORT, supra note 8, at 19.
60. See Stephen G. Bunch et al., Is a Match Really a Match? A Primer on the Procedures and Validity of Firearm and Toolmark Identification, FBI (July 2009),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-sciencecommunications/fsc/july2009/review/2009_07_review01.htm.
61. See AFTE Committee for the Advancement of the Science of Firearm and Tool
Mark Identification, The Response of the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners
to the February 2009 National Academy of Science Report “Strengthening Forensic Science
in the United States: A Path Forward,” 41 ASS’N FIREARMS & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS J. 204,
205 (2009), https://afte.org/uploads/documents/position-nas-2009.pdf (“There is an extensive
body of research, extending back over one hundred years, which establishes the accuracy,
reliability, and validity of conclusions rendered in the field of firearm and toolmark identification.”).
62. See Response to the PCAST Report on Forensic Science, ASS’N OF FIREARMS &
TOOL MARK EXAM’RS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://afte.org/uploads/documents/AFTE-PCASTResponse.pdf.
63. Id.
64. See generally studies referred to in Sarah Lucy Cooper, Firearms Identification
Evidence: Emerging Themes from Recent Criticism, Research and Case Law, in FORENSIC
REFORM: PROTECTING THE INNOCENT 174 (Wendy J. Kohen & C. Michael Bowers eds.,
2017).
65. See ATF’s Response to the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and TechnolASS’N
FOR
IDENTIFICATION
1
(Sept.
21,
2016),
ogy
Report,
INT’L
https://www.theiai.org/president/20160921_ATF_PCAST_Response.pdf.
66. Id.
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With respect to PCAST’s recommendation that courts should restrict the
admission of firearm and tool mark evidence, ATF strongly agrees with
the DOJ decision not to adopt that recommendation as the existing legal
standards regarding the admissibility of firearm and tool mark evidence
are based on sound science and sound legal reasoning. Decades of legal
precedent—and the underlying scientific research on which the courts
have relied—establish that forensic firearm and tool mark evidence is
both reliable and of substantial value to juries in determining the facts.
Firearm and tool mark evidence not only aids prosecutors and defense attorneys in the courtroom, it also enhances public safety and protects the
innocent by providing law enforcement with science-based tools to focus
scarce investigative resources on actual perpetrators.67

Notably, the NCFS, established in 2013 following recommendations in
Strengthening, has adopted a number of recommendations related to advancing scientific inquiry and research across forensic science, including how
forensic science evidence is reported and testified about in court.68 The Department of Justice is also in the process of developing guidance documents
governing the testimony and reports of its forensic experts.69 To date, no
uniform testimony guidelines have been provided in relation to firearms
identification.70
C.

Court Responses

The disagreement amongst stakeholders described in Part II(B) naturally demonstrates that a level of uncertainty exists about firearms identification evidence. Although firearms identification evidence has routinely satisfied the leading legal standards for admissibility in America for nearly a
century,71 lawyers have recently used this uncertainty to challenge the admissibility of firearms identification evidence in criminal cases.72 This section presents a cohort of such cases from which the authors selected expert
statements to use in their study.
In response, some courts have restricted expert testimony to account
for the alleged uncertainty. These courts have taken various approaches.
Some courts have required examiners to describe their observations. For
example, in United States v. Green,73 the state sought to admit expert testi67. Id.
68. See Reporting and Testimony, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/
reporting-and-testimony (last updated Nov. 6, 2017).
69. See Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/
forensic-science (last visited May 17, 2017).
70. Id.
71. See generally Cooper, supra note 64.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
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mony that Green’s pistol could be matched, “to the exclusion of every other
firearm in the world.”74 The court prevented this conclusion, permitting the
examiner to only “describe and explain the ways in which the earlier casings
are similar to the shell casings test-fired from the . . . pistol.”75
Other courts have required examiners to testify to degrees of certainty.
In United States v. Diaz,76 the court allowed the firearms examiner to testify
to “a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.”77 This language was also permitted in Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang.78 Similarly, in United States v.
Taylor,79 the court restricted the examiner to testifying that the ammunition
came from Taylor’s rifle to within a “reasonable degree of certainty in the
firearms examination field.”80 In United States v. Otero,81 the court found
testimony to a “reasonable degree of professional certainty” was permissible.82 A slightly different approach emerged in United States v. Glynn,83
where the court limited the examiner, inter alia, to testifying that “a firearms
match was ‘more likely than not.’”84
On the other hand, some courts have continued to allow testimony that
conveys absolute conclusions. For instance, in United States v. Natson,85 a
court sanctioned testimony from a firearms examiner that the tool-marks
present on a suspect cartridge “was fired” by Natson’s gun. In United States
v. Melcher,86 the trial court ordered that the expert should not testify that he
was “one hundred percent” sure, but the expert did, in fact, state that the
“‘chances of another firearm creating [the] exact same pattern are so remote
to be considered practically impossible.’”87 The appellate court acknowledged that the expert had come “close to the line” of expressing one hundred
percent certainty, but nonetheless rejected the appeal.88 In United States v.
Mouzone,89 the expert was ordered not to testify that it was a practical impossibility for different firearms to have fired the suspect casings or that he
74. Id. at 107.
75. Id. at 108–09.
76. United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 485967 at *11–14.
77. Id. at *11.
78. Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848–851, 942 N.E.2d 927, 945–948
(Mass. 2011).
79. United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009).
80. Id.
81. United States v. Otero, 849 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (D.N.J. 2012).
82. Id.
83. United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
84. Id. at 575.
85. United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
86. United States v. Melcher, No. 12-0544 WHO (PR), 2014 WL 31359, at *12 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014).
87. Id. at *12.
88. Id. at *13.
89. United States v. Mouzone, 687 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 2012).
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was certain about his conclusions.90 At trial, however, the expert repeatedly
testified that the casings found at two different murder scenes were “‘fired
from the same firearm.’”91 Mouzone appealed on this point.92 Like in
Melcher, however, the appellate court rejected the appeal.93
The authors used these cases (and the AFTE Theory of Identification)
to generate and select expert statements for their study. The practical impact
of such statements in a courtroom is important to investigate. This is because jurors must determine the weight of such evidence in criminal trials,
and research indicates that various challenges can arise when jurors assess
scientific evidence. Part III discusses associated literature and the authors’
study.
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND JUROR ASSESSMENT OF CERTAINTY: EXISTING
LITERATURE AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
Jurors in criminal cases can encounter various obstacles, both of a personal and institutional nature, when assessing scientific evidence.94 Given
the crucial role jurors and forensic science evidence play in the criminal
justice system, research examining this issue is important. As the NAS stated in Strengthening,
Jurors’ use and comprehension of forensic evidence is not well studied.
Better understanding is needed in this area, and recommendations are
needed for programs or methods that will better prepare juries in appropriate, unbiased ways for trials in which scientific evidence is expected
to play a large or pivotal role.95

This section explores existing literature on this topic and presents the
method and findings of the authors’ study against this backdrop.
A.

Existing Literature

Examining juror certainty based on expert testimony is a complex process because of the context-dependant nature of the field.96 Participant assessment of the credibility of experts has been extensively studied, both
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 217.
94. See generally Cooper, supra note 12; Cooper, supra note 64.
95. STRENGTHENING, supra note 4, at 237.
96. Saks, M.J., Risinger, D.M., Rosenthal, R. & Thompson, W.C., Context Effects in
Forensic Science: A Review and Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory
Practice in the United States, SCI. & JUST., 43, 77–90 (2003).
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generally97 and specifically in courtrooms.98 Recent studies continue to reflect the complexity of the area. In 2015, Blackwell and Seymour concluded
that jurors rank relevant professional experience, lack of bias, and clarity of
evidence in order of importance.99 Confidence, eye-contact and academic
qualifications are ranked as less important.100 In 2015, Thompson and Newman found that perceptions of both DNA and shoeprint evidence are modified by prior expectation and belief as well as the content of the evidence
itself.101 Studies have also shown that some expert witnesses are prepared
for testimony by trial consultants, to increase the credibility and believability of their evidence.102 This level of context makes examining the content of
any expert statements, including statements about firearms identification
evidence, challenging.
Koehler and Ritchie attempted to remove much of the context while
examining expert statements (about DNA evidence) of numerical certainty
using simplified experimental designs.103 These studies suggest that exclusion percentages104 are more likely to result in conviction than if an expert
were to testify in terms of frequency ratios.105 However, the case law described in Part II(C) shows that forensic experts, specifically firearms examiners, can and often do testify using solely linguistic or ordinal categorybased evidence. 106 Naturally, any verbal certainty judgements, made without
explicit statistical information, are a balance between the meaning of a
97. See generally Chanthika Pornpitakpan, The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A
Critical Review of Five Decades’ Evidence, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 243 (2004).
98. See generally Stanley L. Brodsky, Michael P. Griffin, & Robert J. Cramer, The
Witness Credibility Scale: An Outcome Measure for Expert Witness Research, 28 BEHAV.
SCI. & L., 892 (2010).
99. Suzanne Blackwell & Fred Seymour, Expert Evidence and Jurors’ Views on Expert
Witnesses, 22 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 673, 678 (2015).
100. Id.
101. William C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics: Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents,
39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 332, 332 (2015).
102. Robert J. Cramer, et al., A Confidence-Credibility Model of Expert Witness Persuasion: Mediating Effects & Implications for Trial Consultation, CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J:
PRAC. & RES. 129, 130 (2011).
103. See generally Johnathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom:
How to Make DNA Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275
(2001); see generally J. Ritchie, Probabilistic DNA Evidence: The Layperson’s Interpretation, 47 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI., 440 (2015).
104. For example, a statement such as “the probability that the suspect would match the
blood specimen if he wasn’t the source is 0.1%.”
105. For example, a statement such as “the frequency that the suspect would match the
blood specimen if he wasn’t the source is 1 in 1000.”
106. Evidence that suggests a fixed hierarchy, but the numerical difference between the
categories is not fixed, for example, statements such as “likely,” “very likely,” and “extremely likely.”
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phrase given by the expert and the interpreter’s own subjective understanding of the evidence.107
The inherent problem with these ordinal statements has been the focus
of some examination. Krauss and Sales108 manipulated the type of expert
testimony (clinical versus actuarial), finding that participants were more
influenced by the qualitative, linguistic evidence.109 Martire et al found that
inculpatory evidence was significantly more likely to be seen as weak if it
was presented in terms of linguistic descriptions than in terms of numerical
likelihood.110 Despite the Association of Forensic Science Providers guidelines suggesting forensic experts use likelihood ratios, uptake has varied
between disciplines and jurisdictions.111
In 2008, McQuiston-Surrett and Saks asked participants to rate an
odontology expert’s intended certainty, on a scale from zero to one hundred,
from four phrases taken from American Board of Forensic Odontology
(ABFO) guidelines.112 Responses showed that participant estimates did not
mirror the intended hierarchy.113 For example, the use of the term “a match”
was assumed by ABFO to mean “No expression of specificity intended; generally similar but true for large percentage of population,” but was rated as
the most certain statement (86/100) by participants, ahead of “consistent
with” (75) another statement assumed to be uncertain, and significantly
above both more certain phrases – “probable” (57) and “reasonable scientific certainty” (70).114 The researchers concluded that expert witnesses cannot merely create a definition for a term and expect judges and juries to understand what they mean.115

107. Thomas S. Wallsten, Samuel Fillenbaum, & James A. Cox, Base Rate Effects on the
Interpretations of Probability and Frequency Expressions, J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 571
(1986).
108. Daniel A. Kraus & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert
Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L.
267, 276–77 (2001).
109. Id. Clinical meaning expert testimony based on personal experience of the subject;
and actuarial meaning a numerically-based risk factor taken from research on large groups of
people.
110. Kristy A. Martire et al., The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic
Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 197, 200 (2013).
111. Id.
112. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in
the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 1159 (2008).
113. Id. at 1162–63.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1163.
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McQuiston-Surrett and Saks followed up this study with an examination of certainty statements in microscopic hair evidence.116 They examined
both potential jurors and judicial participants, including a comparison between two subjective qualitative statements – “match” and “similar in all
microscopic characteristics,” and three quantitative statements – “objective
single-probability,” “subjective probability,” and “objective multiplefrequency.”117 They found that the qualitative statements were deemed significantly more certain than the subjective probability or objective multiplefrequency statements.118 Non-judicial participants were particularly susceptible to this effect.119 Unlike in their 2008 study, they did not find a significant difference between the two qualitative statements, with both scoring
around seventy-nine on a zero to one hundred scale.120 Based on these studies, they concluded that empirical testing of the responses to the relevant
words and phrases is needed, and that a simple approach would be best.121
Understanding more about juror interpretation of qualitative, languagebased evidence is particularly important. This is because studies suggest that
expert testimony couched in absolute terms may sensitize or inure potential
jury members to evidence, resulting in higher certainty judgments because
such testimony is considered to clarify an otherwise ‘grey’ situation.122 Jurors have been found to show a lack of skill in distinguishing between evidence-based findings and flawed science.123 Jurors’ understanding of internal validity difficulties in expert evidence, such as the robustness of methods used by experts, has also been shown to be flawed.124 The conclusion
was that there is a need to examine the effectiveness of traditional legal
safeguards against unfounded, seemingly-scientific testimony.125 In fact, in
general, it has been found that participants in a range of experimental situa-

116. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV,
436–453 (2009).
117. Id. at 437–438.
118. Id. at 444.
119. Id. at 445.
120. Id. at 443.
121. Id; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 112, at 1163.
122. Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials:
A Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55(3) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372, 383 (1988); Margaret Bell Kovera et al., Does Expert Psychological Testimony Inform or Influence Juror
Decision Making? A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82(1) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 178, 188 (1997).
123. Bradley D. McAuliff & Margaret Bell Kovera, Juror Need for Cognition and Sensitivity to Methodological Flaws in Expert Evidence, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 385 (2008).
124. Id.
125. Bradley D. McAuliff & Tejah D. Duckworth, I Spy with My Little Eye: Jurors’ Detection of Internal Validity Threats in Expert Evidence, 34(6) L. & HUM. BEHAV, 489, 499
(2010).
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tions are often poor at assessing their own understanding of information and
their own decision-making processes.126
This existing literature suggests that qualitative, language-based expert
testimony, including that outlined in Part II(C),127 is poorly understood by
the juror pool, but simultaneously viewed as powerful and compelling by
those same participants. This is a concerning combination of findings,
meaning further understanding of these statements and their hierarchies is
vital moving forward. The authors’ study aimed to contribute to this need in
the context of firearms identification evidence. Sub-section B outlines our
rationale, methods, and findings.
B.

Rationale

While individualization of firearms identification evidence has the support of some scientific findings,128 a number of studies contest whether these
underpinnings amount to sufficiently powerful evidence for definitive
statements of certainty by experts.129 Some United States courts have
acknowledged this issue, as outlined in Part II(C).130 These courts have restricted expert testimony; instructing experts to not testify in absolute terms,
such as “there is an exact match,” but rather in allegedly more diluted terms,
such as a match can be made “more likely than not” and “to a reasonable
degree of certainty.” The reason the authors chose to focus on firearms identification evidence is because this pattern in judicial decision-making is particularly pronounced.131 Through such cases, an ordinal hierarchy of expert
testimony has, in effect, been created, presuming that such statements would
be ranked as less certain [than an exact match] by jurors. What is not
known, however, are the numerical differences between these statements
when jurors assess certainty. This is the area the authors’ study aimed to
examine further.

126. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Elizabeth W. Dunn, Self-Knowledge: Its Limits,
Value, and Potential for Improvement, 55 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 493, 504 (2004).
127. See supra Part II(C).
128. See, e.g., Ronald G. Nichols, Firearm and Toolmark Identification Criteria: A Review of the Literature, Part II, 48(2) J. FORENSIC SCI. 318 (2003); Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification Discipline:
Responding to Recent Challenges, 52(3) J. FORENSIC SCI. 586–93 (2007).
129. See Mark Page, Jane Taylor & Matt Blenkin, Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part II - Judicial Reasoning in Decisions to Exclude Forensic Identification Evidence on Grounds of Reliability, 56(4) J. FORENSIC SCI. 913, 917 (2011).
130. See supra Part II(C).
131. See, e.g., Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court
Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 287 (2013); Cooper,
supra note 62, at 470
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IV. METHODS, RESULTS, AND FINDINGS
A.

Methods

Using an online questionnaire, participants were recruited through academic, professional, and community links across the United States. In total,
107 participants were placed in the role of a juror in a criminal trial. Participants were told that a qualified firearms examiner, testifying for the state,
had been asked to testify as to whether tool-marks produced on ammunition
test-fired from the Defendant’s gun matched tool-marks present on suspect
ammunition found at the crime scene. While appreciating the wider context
in which jury decision-making occurs, the authors purposely designed such
a basic scenario in order to remove as much context as possible and to therefore encourage participants to focus solely on the content of the expert
statements. The authors also deliberately sought participants from across the
general population. The only eligibility requirement was that participants be
eligible for federal jury service, which was determined by participants answering a number of closed-answer questions.
Participants were provided twelve different expert statements in pseudo-random order. They were asked to rank their level of certainty, based on
each statement, on a scale of zero to one hundred.132 The expert statements
were chosen from statements referenced in case law, such as that outlined in
Part II(C),133 and with reference to the AFTE Theory. The authors ordered
the statements into a generally ordinal hierarchy of certainty. Three statements were hypothesised to attract high-certainty and three low-certainty.
The remaining seven statements were hypothesised to attract moderate levels of certainty.
The study simply sought to determine the statistical validity of the specific hierarchy of certainty.
B.

Findings

The ordinal hierarchy was found to show a significant general trend in
the expected direction. The following sub-sections present means and standard deviations for each statement; results that showed significant differences
between statements; and a summary about the meaning and implications of
our findings.

132. Zero being the least certain and one hundred being the most.
133. See supra Part II(C).
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Means and Standard Deviations

Table A shows the mean certainties, standard deviations, and significant differences found for each expert statement. The Mean is the average
score of certainty for each statement across participants. The Standard Deviation is the average amount each individual participant varied away from
that Mean. The larger the Standard Deviation, the wider spread the participants’ scores for certainty were for the relevant statement. A smaller Standard Deviation shows participants’ scores for the relevant statement are more
clustered together. The size of the Standard Deviation is important because
it impacts ‘significance’ as explained in sub-section (b)2 below.
Table A: Mean Certainties, Standard Deviations, and Significant Differences
Number

1
2

3

4

5

Expert Statement

Mean
Certainty

Standard
Deviation

Significantly
less certain
statements
STATEMENTS HYPOTHESISED TO ATTRACT HIGH LEVELS OF
CERTAINTY
“There is a match to the exclu- 68.94
35.12
9, 10, 11, 12
sion of every other firearm in
the world.”
“There is an exact match be- 92.05
15.92
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
tween the suspect ammunition
8, 9, 10, 11,
and the ammunition test fired
12
from the Defendant’s gun.”
“The chances of another fire- 77.96
28.95
1, 8, 9, 10, 11,
arm creating the exact same
12
tool-marks are so remote as to
be considered practically impossible.”
STATEMENTS HYPOTHESISED TO ATTRACT MODERATE LEVELS
OF CERTAINTY
“A match between suspect am- 72.50
20.83
8, 9 10, 11,12
munition and ammunition testfired from the defendant’s gun
can be made to a practical certainty.”
“There is a match between sus- 73.80
19.97
8, 9, 10, 11,
pect ammunition and ammuni12
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tion test-fired from the defendant’s gun to a reasonable degree
of ballistic certainty.”
“A match between suspect am- 74.79
17.91
8, 9, 10, 11,
munition and ammunition test12
fired from the defendant’s gun
can be made to a reasonable
degree of certainty in the ballistics field.”
“A match between suspect am- 72.64
18.25
8, 9, 10, 11,
munition and ammunition test12
fired from the defendant’s gun
can be made to a reasonable
degree of professional certainty.”
“A match between suspect am- 66.59
21.57
9, 10, 11, 12
munition and ammunition testfired from the defendant’s gun
can be made to a reasonable
degree of certainty in the firearms examination field.”
“A match between suspect am- 56.83
21.42
10, 11, 12
munition and ammunition testfired from the defendant’s gun
is more likely than not.”
STATEMENTS HYPOTHESISED TO ATTRACT LOW LEVELS OF
CERTAINTY
“The results of my examination 22.75
30.90
1-9
of the ammunition test-fired
from the Defendant’s gun and
suspect ammunition are inconclusive.”
“There is significant disagree- 28.43
29.93
1-9
ment in discernible class characteristics and individual characteristics between the suspect
ammunition and those test-fired
by the Defendant’s gun.”
“The suspect ammunition is 22.29
29.18
1-9
unsuitable for comparison with
ammunition test-fired from the
Defendant’s gun.”
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Figure A: Means and Standard Deviation Ranges
Figure A shows the Mean certainty for statements 1-12 (0-100) and the
Standard Deviation range for each statement.

Figure A: Means and Standard Deviations for each of the statements
The information from Table A and Figure A was statistically analyzed
to consider whether significant differences existed between the statements
and, therefore, whether the general ordinal hierarchy was valid.
2.

Significant Differences

The authors undertook a statistical analysis that examined the Mean
and Standard Deviation variance and compared it between statements. In
short, if the Means (for each statement) are different and the Standard Devi-
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ations (within each statement) show there is a low level of variability in
scores, the statements are significantly different. The further apart the
Means are between each statement, the more likely it is that a significant
difference will be produced. However, as Standard Deviation increases, significance is less likely, as the scores are spread out more. A ‘significant difference’ means we can generalize our findings to the population our participant sample came from, in this case, the United States federal juror pool.
We used an ANOVA (statistical Analysis of Variance) to see if there
was an overall significant difference between the statements and found there
was. We then used t-tests134 to compare each pair of statements separately
for differences, one-on-one. This produced the results in Table B.
Table B: Significant Differences Between Expert Statements135
Number Expert Statement
1
2

3

4

5

6

Expert Statement was found to
elicit significantly more certainty
than statements
“There is a match to the exclusion of 9, 10, 11 and 12.
every other firearm in the world.”
“There is an exact match between the 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
suspect ammunition and the ammunition test fired from the Defendant’s
gun.”
“The chances of another firearm cre- 1, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
ating the exact same tool-marks are
so remote as to be considered practically impossible.”
“A match between suspect ammuni- 8, 9 10, 11, and 12.
tion and ammunition test-fired from
the defendant’s gun can be made to a
practical certainty.”
“There is a match between suspect 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
ammunition and ammunition testfired from the defendant’s gun to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.”
“A match between suspect ammuni- 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
tion and ammunition test-fired from
the defendant’s gun can be made to a
reasonable degree of certainty in the

134. Sixty-six t tests were used.
135. See infra Appendix A for t-tests data.
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ballistics field.”
“A match between suspect ammunition and ammunition test-fired from
the defendant’s gun can be made to a
reasonable degree of professional
certainty.”
“A match between suspect ammunition and ammunition test-fired from
the defendant’s gun can be made to a
reasonable degree of certainty in the
firearms examination field.”
“A match between suspect ammunition and ammunition test-fired from
the defendant’s gun is more likely
than not.”
“The results of my examination of
the ammunition test-fired from the
Defendant’s gun and suspect ammunition are inconclusive.”
“There is significant disagreement in
discernible class characteristics and
individual characteristics between
the suspect ammunition and those
test-fired by the Defendant’s gun.”
“The suspect ammunition is unsuitable for comparison with ammunition
test-fired from the Defendant’s gun.”

7

8

9

10

11

12

C.
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8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

9, 10, 11, and 12.

10, 11, and 12.

N/A.

N/A.

N/A.

Summary and Implications of Findings

The results show a general trend that the statements hypothesized as
being high-certainty elicit significantly higher levels of certainty than those
hypothesized as moderate-certainty statements and low-certainty statements.
Moderate-certainty statements elicited higher levels of certainty than lowcertainty statements. In other words, the general ordinal hierarchy was found
to show a significant general trend in the expected direction.
The only exception to this trend was Statement 1 (“to the exclusion of
every other firearm in the world”), which was found to elicit significantly
less certainty than the other two high-certainty phrases, and no difference
with all of the moderate-certainty phrases, except for Statement 9 (“more
likely than not”) This is interesting given that the precise language of State-
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ment 1 suggests it was one of, if not the most, certain statement included in
the study. As such, this finding warrants further investigation. Notably,
Statement 3 (“practically impossible”) was only found to elicit more certainty than two of the moderate-certainty statements, namely Statement 8 (“a
reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination field) and Statement 9, and showed no significant difference with Statements 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Statement 2 (“an exact match”) was found to elicit the highest level of certainty from participants, suggesting such language is particularly persuasive
to jurors. This finding suggests that judicial findings that the admissibility of
such evidence is harmless error or is not prejudicial are overlooking juror
perceptions of such evidence; a point Cooper has raised previously.136
With regards to the moderate-certainty statements, Statements 4 (“practical certainty”), 5 (“reasonable degree of ballistic certainty”), 6 (“reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field”), and 7 (“a reasonable degree
of professional certainty”) did not show any inter-statement differences.
However, these statements did elicit more certainty from participants than
Statements 8 (“a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination
field”) and 9 (“more likely than not”). This suggests that when experts convey their conclusions in terms of “practical,” “professional,” and “ballistic”
certainty, they are seen by participants as more certainty-inducing than when
they convey their conclusions in terms of “firearms-related” certainty. Notably, Statement 8 was found to induce more certainty than Statement 9.
Statement 9 only elicited more certainty than the low-certainty statements.
As expected, all high-certainty and moderate-certainty statements induced
more certainty in participants than the low certainty statements, namely
Statements 10 (“inconclusive”), 11 (“significant disagreement”), and 12
(“unsuitable for comparisons”). No significant differences were found between the three low-certainty phrases. All low-certainty statements generated some certainty in participants, including Statement 12, even though the
statement conveyed that examined comparison could not take place.
The authors’ findings with regard to the moderate-certainty statements
are particularly important because these sorts of statements have been employed by the judiciary to address current uncertainty about firearms identification evidence. Our results suggest that the judiciary’s assumption that
these moderate-certainty phrases convey less certainty (and will be interpreted as such by jurors) than language akin to individualization is valid.

136. Cooper, supra note 64, at 460 (“In relation to preventing frivolous claims from
flooding the system, courts often conclude that the admission of such evidence was nonprejudicial in light of other evidence against the defendant. In other words, courts are terming
the legally sound or unsound admission of firearms-identification evidence as immaterial.
However, this rationale arguably overlooks the high impact scientific evidence has on jurors
and the difficulty they have in accurately evaluating scientific evidence.”).
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However, there are a few points to note. First, our study suggests that
moderate-certainty statements do still attract notable certainty scores (72.5–
74.8%) – they are not immaterial. Our results suggest that moderatecertainty statements do still persuade jurors more towards determining that
the relevant evidence is inculpatory. As such, stakeholders should consider
that such statements will not necessarily detract jurors from findings of
guilt. Again, our findings suggest that the judiciary should be mindful of
rejecting challenges to firearms identification evidence on the basis that admitting such evidence (presented in moderate-certainty formats, as well as
high-certainty formats) was non-prejudicial or harmless in light of other
evidence against the defendant.
Second, our results show that not all moderate-certainty statements are
interpreted to convey similar levels of certainty by potential jurors. Statement 8 (66.6%) and Statement 9 (56.8%) induced significantly lower levels
of certainty in participants than all other moderate-certainty phrases, which
attracted certainty scores of 72.5–74.8%. As such, the judiciary should be
mindful not to use all moderate-certainty statements as if they are synonymous in meaning. Consider the case of Melcher, for example. In rejecting
Melcher’s appeal, the court commented that the difference between “practical certainty” and “considered practically impossible” versus “reasonable
degree of certainty” or “more likely than not” would not tip the outcome of
the case.137 Although our results support the notion that there is no significant difference between the phrases “practical certainty,” “practical impossibility,” and “reasonable degree of certainty,” they do suggest there is a
significant difference between an expert using these three phrases and the
phrase “more likely than not,” which, our study suggests, is viewed as significantly less certain by jurors.
V. CONCLUSION
Criticism about the ability of crime-solving forensic disciplines, including firearms identification, to engage in valid individualization has grown
throughout the 1990s and new millennium. Some American courts have
acknowledged the existence of scientific uncertainty in the context of firearms individualization evidence since 2005. To address this uncertainty,
these courts have restricted expert testimony; instructing experts to not testify in absolute terms, such as “there is an exact match,” but rather in allegedly more diluted terms, such as a match can be made “more likely than not”
and “to a reasonable degree of certainty.”138
137. United States v. Melcher, No. 12-0544 WHO (PR), 2014 WL 31359, at *13 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014).
138. See supra Part II(C)
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In criminal trials, jurors must determine the weight of expert evidence,
and, thus, must assess how much certainty to attach to these various expert
phrases. Given that research suggests that jurors might find this task challenging, and the existence of a particularly pronounced pattern of such judicial decision-making in firearms identification evidence cases, the authors
conducted a study examining the effect of twelve expert statements of certainty, by a qualified firearms examiner, on potential jurors. Results from a
sample of 107 participants found a significant main effect for certainty, suggesting that participant certainty was influenced by expert testimony in an
expected direction along an ordinal hierarchy.
In the context of firearms identification evidence, the findings of the
authors’ study add to the body of literature that has found jurors to be influenced by qualitative, linguistic evidence, and that such evidence can elicit
notable scores of certainty from jurors. Our results also affirm the findings
of previous studies that expert testimony couched in absolute terms may
particularly inure jurors to such evidence. In so doing, the authors’ study
responds to calls from researchers and national organizations to further investigate jurors’ use and comprehension of certain words and phrases involved in forensic expert testimony, and the study provides some evidence
with which to move forward.
On the basis of our findings, the authors echo the call for further research in this area. In particular, the authors suggest further investigation of
(1) ordinal hierarchies of expert language used in relation to other forensic
science disciplines subject to similar criticisms as firearms identification
evidence; (2) whether a more significant ordinal hierarchy exists in relation
to the moderate-certainty statements identified in the context of firearms
identification evidence; (3) further examination of very high certainty
phrases; (4) whether adding context influences juror interpretation of certainty, and, thus, the established hierarchy, e.g. by highlighting the alleged
limitations of firearms identification evidence; and (5) on what basis jurors
attach certainty to low, moderate, and high-certainty expert statements.
Appendix A
Pair 11: Statement 1 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 11.051, p = .000).
Pair 12: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 3 (t[106] = 5.040, p = .000).
Pair 13: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 4 (t[106] = 11.090, p = .000).
Pair 14: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 5 (t[106] = 10.210, p = .000).

significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
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Pair 15: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 6 (t[106] = 8.638, p = .000).
Pair 16: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 7 (t[106] = 11.425, p = .000).
Pair 17: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 8 (t[106] = 11.549, p = .000).
Pair 18: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 13.005, p = .000).
Pair 19: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 19.05, p = .000).
Pair 20: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 17.943, p = .000).
Pair 21: Statement 2 was found to elicit
than statement 12 t(106) = 11.051, p<.000.
Pair 26: Statement 3 was found to elicit
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.528, p = .001).
Pair 27: Statement 3 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 5.669, p = .000).
Pair 28: Statement 3 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 12.870, p = .000).
Pair 29: Statement 3 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 11.770, p = .000).
Pair 30: Statement 3 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 14.091, p = .000).
Pair 34: Statement 4 was found to elicit
than statement 8 (t[106] = 2.610, p = .010).
Pair 35: Statement 4 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 6.099, p = .000).
Pair 36: Statement 4 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 13.200, p = .000).
Pair 37: Statement 4 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 13.179, p = .000).
Pair 38: Statement 4 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 14.875, p = .000).
Pair 41: Statement 5 was found to elicit
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.271, p < 0.001).
Pair 42: Statement 5 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 6.913, p < 0.001).
Pair 43: Statement 5 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 14.296, p < 0.001).
Pair 44: Statement 5 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 13.626, p < 0.001).
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Pair 45: Statement 5 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 15.641, p < 0.001).
Pair 47: Statement 6 was found to elicit
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.587, p = 0.001).
Pair 48: Statement 6 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 7.873, p < 0.001).
Pair 49: Statement 6 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 16.196, p < 0.001).
Pair 50: Statement 6 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 14.793, p < 0.001).
Pair 51: Statement 6 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 17.066, p < 0.001).
Pair 52: Statement 7 was found to elicit
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.279, p = 0.001).
Pair 53: Statement 7 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 6.690, p < 0.001).
Pair 54: Statement 7 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 13.740, p < 0.001).
Pair 55: Statement 7 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 13.368, p < 0.001).
Pair 56: Statement 7 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 16.138, p < 0.001).
Pair 57: Statement 8 was found to elicit
than statement 9 (t[106] = 3.915, p < 0.001).
Pair 58: Statement 8 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 12.609, p < 0.001).
Pair 59: Statement 8 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 10.804, p < 0.001).
Pair 60: Statement 8 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 13.724, p < 0.001).
Pair 61: Statement 9 was found to elicit
than statement 10 (t[106] = 10.146, p < 0.001).
Pair 62: Statement 9 was found to elicit
than statement 11 (t[106] = 8.346, p < 0.001).
Pair 63: Statement 9 was found to elicit
than statement 12 (t[106] = 10.877, p < 0.001).

119

significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty
significantly more certainty

